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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
i,

The Nature of the Case.

This is an action to recover damages due under a lender's policy of title insurance
("the Policy"), brought by the insured, Bank of Idaho ("BOI"), against First American Title
Insurance Company ("FA TCO"), successor in interest to United General Title Insurance
Company ("United General"), which issued the subject policy through its authorized agent,
Mountain West Title and Escrow ("Mountain West"). (R. Vol. 1, pp. 5-7.) The District Court
granted FA TCO' s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the policy at issue did not
provide coverage for BOl's losses. (R. Vol.

p.461.) BOI respectfully appeals from that

determination. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 470-73.)
ii.

The Course of Proceedings Below.

BOI filed its complaint on January 27,2012. CR. Vol. 1, p. 1.) FATCO answered
on April 19, 2012, and the parties exchanged rounds of written discovery. (Id. ) FA TCO' s
answer admitted many of the basic facts alleged in the complaint, but asserted numerous
affirmative defenses based on various policy provisions. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 310-14.)
In challenging these defenses, BOI filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on April 5, 2013, asking for judgment in its favor on the issue of FA TCO' s liability under the
Policy, but leaving the disputed issue of damages for later determination. CR. Vol. 1, pp. 146-7.)
In addition to its memorandum in support, BOI offered the affidavit of Larry Bell, BOl's Vice
President and Regional Real Estate Manager, with copies of the preliminary title commitment
and the policy at issue attached as exhibits. CR. Vol. 1, pp. 68-110.) BOI also filed an affidavit
of counsel attaching various other documents exchanged by the parties. CR. Vol. 1, pp. 25-67.)

FATCO filed its own motion for summary judgment on April 11, 2013, asserting
that BOI had not suffered a loss covered by the Policy. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 149-52.) FATCO
supported its motion with a memorandum and affidavits with attached exhibits from Jeffry
Young, FATCO' s Senior Claims Counsel,

CR. Vol. 2, pp.

167-225), Jeffrey Kelley, a certified

appraiser, (R. Vol. 2, pp. 226-283). and counsel, CR. Vol. 2, pp. 284-316.).
Both parties submitted memoranda in opposition to each other's motions, and BOI
also filed second affidavits with attached exhibits from Larry Bell, (R. Vol. 2, pp. 328-62.), and
counsel, (R. Vol. 2, pp. 363-79.), in opposition. The parties then filed reply memoranda in
support of their respective motions, and FA TCO also filed a motion to strike certain portions of
Larry Bell's affdavits, (R. Vol. 2, pp. 427-8.), with a supporting memorandum, to which BOI
filed a memorandum in opposition.
The District Court heard the parties' motions on May 9,2013 and took the matter
under advisement. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 450-1.) On May 28,2013, the Court issued its memorandum
decision and order granting FATCO's motion to strike in part, granting FATCO's motion for
summary judgment and denying Bors motion. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 452-62.) Judgment of dismissal
was entered on May 28,2013, CR. Vol. 2, p. 463-4.), and BOI timely filed its notice of appeal on
June 24, 2013. CR. Vol. 2, pp. 470-4.)
iii.

Statement of Facts.

The policy at issue in this case was issued to BOI in conjunction with financing a
residential development project on adjoining lots in Idaho Falls, at the request of its customers,
Brian and Amy Peterson (the "Petersons"). CR. Vol. 1, pp. 68-9,

~

2-4.) The Petersons' plans for

the project called for one residential four-plex to be built on Lot 1 and a second to be built on Lot
2

2 with both lots having frontage and access to the city street. (Id.) BOI relied on the Petersons'
plans in structuring the financing and securing the related commitments for title insurance. (Id.)
BOI requested and obtained separate title insurance commitments on each lot through Mountain
West the authorized agent of United General, FATCO's predecessor in interest. (R. Vol. 1, p.
69,

~

4; Vol. 1, p. 5,

~

3-4; Vol. 2, p. 310,412.)

After obtaining the commitments, BOI finalized the project's financing with two
separate construction loans secured by two separate deeds of trust on Lot 1 and Lot 2
respectively, and in due course the two separate title insurance policies were issued.
p. 69,

~

CR. Vol.

1,

6-7.) The policy at issue in this action, Policy No. 64092871 (the "Policy"), insured Lot

L and a second policy which is not at issue insured Lot 2. (Id.) For ease of reference, a complete
copy of the Policy is attached to the first Affidavit of Larry Bell as Exhibit 2. (R. Vol. 1, p. 69, ~
Vol. 1, pp. 95-110.)
As a part of the transaction, BOI requested and paid an extra premium for the
extended coverage provided by several endorsements, including Endorsement No. 116. (R. Vol.
1, p. 69,

~

5; Vol. L p. 89.) In addition to the more common types of coverage typically

contained in title policies, Endorsement 116 expressly insured BOI against any "loss or damage"
it sustained because of the failure to locate the planned four-plex on Lot 1, providing in pertinent
part:
The Company hereby insures the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage against loss or damage which the insured shall sustain by reason of the failure
of (i) a MULTI FAMILY RESIDENCE (description a/improvement e.g. "a single
family residence") known as 1354 E 16 th Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83401 (street address),
to be located on the land at Date of Policy, ... (Emphasis in original.)
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CR.

Vol. 1, p. 110.) BOI specifically requested the inclusion of Endorsement 116 because it

wanted assurance that the planned building was actually built on Lot 1as legally described in the
deed of trust in accordance with its standard practices when financing new construction.
2, p. 330,

~

CR. VoL

8.)
In fact, the required four-plex was never built on Lot 1.

CR. Vol.

1, p. 70, ~ 9.)

Instead, without BOl's knowledge or consent, both four-plexes were built on Lot 2, and only a
storm water retention pond, garbage bin and parking lot were located on Lot 1. (Id.)
The failure to locate one of the four-plexes on Lot 1 substantially decreased its
value.

CR. Vol.

L p. 70,

~

10.) Although the parties dispute the amount of diminution, the

appraisal BOJ originally obtained in conjunction with financing the project provides that the
market value of Lot 1 with the proposed four-plex on it was $279,000.00 as of December 13.
2006. (R. Vol. 2, p. 329,

~

4; Vol. 2, p. 339.) According FATCO's own appraiser, the appraised

value of Lot 1 "as built" was $22,000.00 as of September 6,2011, a difference of$257,000.00.
(R. Vol. 2, p. 329, ~ 5: Vol. 2, p. 234.)
The failure to locate one of the four-plexes on Lot 1 also eliminated BOl's ability
to replace the short-term construction loans on the two parcels with long-term loans that could
then be sold into the secondary market. (R. Vol. 1, p. 70,
those at issue in its own loan portfolio.

~

10.) BOI does not retain loans like

CR. Vol. 2, pp. 331-2, ~

13.) Instead, it routinely sells

them into the secondary mortgage market. (Id.) Consequently, BOl's original plan was to
finance each unit separately so its debt instruments would qualifY for sale on the secondary
market. (Id.)

4

However, in March, 2009, when BOl attempted to close out the construction loans
on Lots 1 and 2 and replace them with the long-term loans that would constitute the Petersons'
long term financing, which could then be individually sold into the secondary market, it was
precluded from doing so because both four-plexes had been built on Lot 2, and the two parcels
could no longer be sold separately. (R. Vol. 1, p. 70,

~

9-10; Vol. 2, pp. 331-2, ~113, p. 333,

~

17.) At that point, BOI attempted to mitigate its damages by modifying the original deeds of
trust to "cross-collateralize" the lots with a combined legal description. CR. Vol. 2, p. 333, ~ 20;
Vol. 2, pp. 197-8.)
The secondary market for loans for 1-4 family units is entirely different than
multi-family units in excess of four units. CR. Vol. 2, p. 332,

~

15.) BOT made inquiries and

could not locate a lender that would accept the single eight-unit property as collateral. CR. Vol. 2,
p. 332, III 13.) As a result, BOI was left without a secondary market for its debt instruments
because the property was characterized "as built" as an eight-plex, tightly squeezed onto an
undersized lot. CR. Vol. 2, p. 332-3,

~

13,18.)

The Petersons subsequently defaulted on the construction loans and filed
bankruptcy. The trustee initiated foreclosure proceedings, recording the Notice of Default and
Election to Sell for Lot 1 on October 29,2009. CR. Vol. 1, p. 70,

~

11: Vol. 2, p. 356.)

According to the Notice, as of October 27, 2009, there was a total of $232,424.57 due and owing,
plus $989.00 for the cost of the trustee's sale guarantee, attorney's fees and other expenses of
foreclosure. (R. Vol. 2, p. 356.) From the time the Petersons defaulted on the loans through the
foreclosure and sale process until the date BOl was eventually able to resell both lots as a single

5

unit, it incurred additional out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of at least $37,816.05. (R. Vol.
p. 329,

~

9.)
The trustee's sale occurred on March 11,2010, BOI made credit bids for all

amounts due and owing on each lot at the sale, and the trustee conveyed both lots to BOlon
;\1arch 15,2010.

CR. Vol.

pp. 211-6.) In an attempt to mitigate its losses, BOI finally resold

both lots as a single unit on November 15, 2010, did not fully recoup its loan losses and
expenses.

CR. VoLl, p. 70,

13: Vol. 2, p. 218.) Although it is a matter of dispute between the

parties, BOI submits it has suffered losses and damages in the amount of at least $128,174.03.
(R. VoL

p. 333,

tT

21.)

In accordance with the terms of the Policy, BOI submitted its Notice of Claim to
Mountain West and United General on June 10,2010. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 30-1.) United General
responded on June 23, 2010, indicating it was investigating the claim and would advise Bor of
its position after doing so. (R. Vol. 1, p. 33.) Nearly nine months later, FATCO finally denied
Bors claim on March 19,2011.

CR. Vol.

1, pp. 65-7.)

In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court indicated it considered the
following provisions of the Policy, which BOI sets forth in full for ease of reference:
2.

CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE.

(a) After Acquisition of Title. The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of
Date of Policy in favor of (i) an insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or
interest in the land by foreclosure, trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu of foreclosure, or
other legal manner which discharges the lien of the insured mortgage; (ii) a transferee of
the estate or interest so acquired from an insured corporation, provided the transferee is
the parent or wholly-owned subsidiary of the insured corporation, and their corporate
successors by operation of law and not by purchase, subject to any rights or defenses the
Company may have against any predecessor insureds; and (iii) ...
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(b) After Conveyance of Title, The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of
Date of Policy in favor of an insured only so long as the insured retains an estate or
interest in the Land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage
given by a purchaser from the insured, or only so long as the insured shall have liability
by reason of covenants of warranty made by the insured in any transfer or conveyance of
the estate or interest. This policy shall not continue in force in favor of any purchaser
from the insured of either (i) an estate or interest in the land, or (ii) an indebtedness
secured by a purchase money mortgage given to the insured.
(c) Amount of Insurance. The amount of insurance after the acquisition or after the
conveyance shall in neither event exceed the least of:
(i) the Amount ofInsurance stated in Schedule A;
(ii) the amount of the principal of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage as of
Date of Policy, interest thereon, expenses of foreclosure, amounts advanced pursuant to
the insured mortgage to assure compliance with laws or to protect the lien of the insured
mortgage prior to the time of acquisition of the estate or interest in the land and secured
thereby and reasonable amounts spent to prevent deterioration of improvements, but
reduced by the amount of all payments made; or
(iii) ...
7.

DETERMINATION AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY,

This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage sustained or
incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by reason of the matters
insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein described.
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall not exceed the least of:
(i) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable, the amount of
insurance as defined in Section 2( c) of these Conditions and Stipulations;
(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage as
limited or provided under Section 8 of these Conditions and Stipulations or as reduced
under Section 9 of these Conditions and Stipulations, at the time the loss or damage
insured against by this policy occurs, together with interest thereon; or
(iii) the difference between the value of the insured estate or interest as insured and the
value of the insured estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance insured
against by this policy.
(b) In the event the insured has acquired the estate or interest in the manner described in
Section 2(a) of these Conditions and Stipulations or has conveyed the title, then the
liability of the Company shall continue as set forth in Section 7(a) of these Conditions
and Stipulations.

7

9. REDUCTION OF INSURANCE; REDUCTION OR TERMINATION OF
LIABILITY.
(a) All payments under this policy, ... shall reduce the amount of insurance pro tanto.
However, any payments made prior to the acquisition of title to the estate or interest as
provided in Section 2(a) of these Conditions and Stipulations shall not reduce pro tanto
the amount of insurance afforded under this policy except to the extent the payments
reduce the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage.
(b) Payment in part by any person of the principal of the indebtedness, or any other
obligation secured by the insured mortgage, or any voluntary partial satisfaction or release
of the insured mortgage, to the extent of the payment, satisfaction or release, shall reduce
the amount of insurance pro tanto. The amount of insurance may thereafter be increased
by accruing interest and advances made to protect the lien of the insured mortgage and
secured thereby, with interest thereon, provided in no event shall the amount of insurance
be greater than the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A.
(c) Payment in full by any person or the voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured
mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company except as provided in Section 2(a)
of these Conditions and Stipulations.

Amount ofInsurance: $227,041.30
Date of Policy: January 8, 2007 at 3:40 PM.

ENDORSEMENT (CLTA Form 116)
The Company hereby insures the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage against loss or damage which the insured shall sustain by reason of the failure
of (i) a MULTI FAMILY RESIDENCE (description of improvement e.g. "a single
family residence") known as 1354 E 16 th Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83401 (street address),
to be located on the land at Date of Policy, or (ii) the map attached to this policy to
cOlTectly show the location and dimensions of the land according to the public records.
This endorsement is issued as part of the policy. Except as it expressly states, it does not
(i) modify any of the terms and provisions of the policy, (ii) modifY any prior
endorsements, (iii) extend the Date of Policy, or (iv) increase the Amount ofInsurance.
To the extent a provision of the policy or a previous endorsement is inconsistent with an
express provision of this endorsement, this endorsement controls. Otherwise, this
endorsement is subject to all ofthe terms and provisions of the policy and any prior
endorsements. (Emphasis in original)
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(R. Vol. 2, pp. 454-7.)

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err in concluding that BOr s full credit bid at the

trustee's sale constituted a "voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured mortgage" which
terminated FATCO' s liability pursuant to Section 9( c) of the Policy Conditions and Stipulations?
2.

Did the District Court err in relying on the full credit bid, given the Idaho

appellate decisions which expressly limit those who can assert a full credit bid as a defense to a
debtor on a secured obligation?
3.

Did the District Court err in construing the meaning and effect of Section

7(a)(ii) of the Policy by concluding that the earliest point that "loss or damage" OCCUlTed is the
time of the foreclosure sale, given the abundant evidence in the record that clearly demonstrates
BOI sustained "loss or damage" before the trustee's sale took place.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
BOl respectfully submits that it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839(1), because this is an action against an insurer that failed to
pay the amount justly due under the Policy.

ARGUMENT
1.

Introduction.

The District Court concluded that BOl did not suffer a loss covered by the Policy.
(R. Vol. 2, p. 461.) It based that conclusion entirely on the fact ofBOl's full credit bid at the
trustee's sale, coupled with its interpretation of the meaning and effect of Sections 2, 7 and 9 of
the Conditions and Stipulations to the Policy. (R. Vol. 2, p. 459-61.) Indeed, the Court even
9

acknowledged that the affidavit testimony of Larry Bell "may be sufficient for creating an issue
of fact about" Bors damages, but nonetheless concluded that was immaterial because "the full
credit bid resolved the debt, and the mortgage must be considered satisfied, with no further
amounts owing." (R. Vol. 2, p. 461.)
Bar respectfully submits that the District Court erred in construing the meaning
and effect Sections 2, 7 and 9, and in its application of the full credit bid to bar Bars recovery.
In particular. the Court's conclusion that the full credit bid constituted a "voluntary satisfaction
or release of the insured mortgage" which terminated FA TCO' s liability pursuant to Section 9( c)
is plainly incorrect, and lies at the heart of the Court's decision. Accordingly, the Court's grant
of summary judgment to FA TCO cannot stand, and should be reversed for each of the reasons
discussed in detail below.

II.

Standard of Review.

This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and
employs the same standard a district court uses to rule on the motion. See, e.g., Stone brook
Canst., LLC v. Chase Home Finance. LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929-30, 277 P.3d 374,376-7 (2012);
Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. o.f Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008). Summary

judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. The Court liberally construes the
record in favor of the party opposing the motion, and draws all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in favor of that party. Id.
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The interpretation of the legal effect of an insurance policy, the meaning of
unambiguous provisions contained therein and the question of whether a given provision is
ambiguous are all questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. Rizzo v. State
Farm Ins. Co., _

Idaho _,305 P.3d 519,523 (2013); Arreguin, 145 Idaho at 461, 180 P.3d at

500. When policy language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its ordinary meaning, and
coverage is determined according to the plain meaning of the words employed. Rizzo,

Idaho

at _,305 P.3d at 523; Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, 419, 234 P.3d 739, 743
(2010).
III.

The District Court's conclusion that BOI's full credit bid at the

trustee's sale constituted a "voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured mortgage"
which terminated F ATCO's liability pursuant to Section 9( c) of the Policy was incorrect
and must be reversed,
The District Court's conclusion that "[u]nder Section 9, the full credit bid
constituted a 'voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured mortgage' which terminated
Defendant's liability" is the core of its decision. (R. Vol. 2, p. 460.) BOI respectfully submits
that conclusion is incorrect for the following reasons.
By its own terms, Section 9( c) does not terminate FATCO' s liability in this case
because BOr made its full credit bid in the context ofa trustee's sale where it acquired legal title
to the property, thereby discharging the mortgage lien. Such circumstances fall squarely within
the express exception to Section 9(c)'s applicability. It provides:
[9]( c) Payment in full by any person or the voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured
mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company except as provided in Section 2(a)
of these Conditions and Stipulations. (Emphasis added.)
1I

(R. Vol.

p.456.)
Thus, the applicability of Section 9( c) is expressly dependent on whether the

circumstances described in Section 2(a) are involved, as they are in this case. Section 2(a)
provides in pertinent part:
2.
CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE.
(a) After Acquisition of Title. The coverage of this polic)' shall continue in force as of
Date of Policy in favor of (i) an insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or
interest in the land by foreclosure, trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu of foreclosure, or
other legal manner
discharges the lien of the insured mortgage; (ii) ...
(Emphasis added.)
(R. VoL 2, p. 454.)
Taken together, the unambiguous meaning and effect of these provisions is that a
"voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured mortgage," which might otherwise terminate
FA TCO' s liability pursuant to Section 9( c), expressly does not do so when is occurs in the
context of a trustee's sale where the insured takes title to the property and the mortgage lien is
thereby discharged. That is precisely what occurred in this case, and therefore, the District
Court's conclusion that Section 9(c) bars BOl's recovery because of its full credit bid is plainly
incorrect.
In its analysis of the effect of Section 2(a) on Section 9(c), the District Court
apparently conflated the language of Section 2(b) with that of Section 2(a), and misunderstood
the plain difference between them. In its discussion of Section 2(a), the Court noted:
Section 2(a) refers to ongoing coverage under the policy in certain circumstances, such as
a warranty claim made by a third-party purchaser following the insured's foreclosure
on the property. Therefore, while Section 2(a) acknowledges ongoing coverage based
upon circumstances different than that currently before the Court, it does not

12

resurrect liability under the present facts when there has been a satisfaction or
release of the insured mortgage. (Emphasis added.)
(R. Vol. 2, p. 459.)

However, Section 2(a) addresses coverage "After Acquisition of Title" by an
insured lender, and expressly addresses the circumstance of an insured lender acquiring title at a
trustee's sale which discharges the mortgage lien. It says nothing about "a warranty claim made
by a third-party purchaser:'
The sole mention of warranty claims anywhere in Section 2 is contained in
Section 2(b), which addresses continuing coverage "After Conveyance of Title, by the insured
and provides that one of the circumstances where coverage may continue after the insured
=~~-=.::;=

is when the insured has potential warranty liability:

[2](b) After Conveyance of Title. The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as
of Date of Policy in favor of an insured only so long as the insured retains an estate or
interest in the Land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage
given by a purchaser from the insured, or only so long as the insured shall have
liability by reason of covenants of warranty made by the insured in any transfer or
conveyance of the estate or interest.... (Emphasis added.)
(R. Vol. 2, p. 455.)
Unlike Section 2(a), Section 2(b) is not referenced in Section 9(c) at all.
Therefore, its language plays no role in interpreting the interplay between Sections 9(c) and 2(a)
that may result in a termination of liability pursuant to Section 9(c), absent circumstances that are
addressed by the specific language of Section 2(a).
Accordingly, the District Court also erred in conflating the language of Section
2(b) with that of Section 2(a) and misinterpreting the distinction between them, thereby
concluding that Section 2(a) addresses "circumstances different than that currently before the
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Court," \vhich do not "resurrect liability under the present facts when there has been a
satisfaction or release of the insured mortgage."
Indeed, precisely the opposite is true. The circumstances here clearly fall within
the express scope of Section 2(a), which in turn means that FATCO's liability is not terminated
by Section 9( c), contrary to the District Court's conclusion. BOl respectfully submits that these
plain errors alone are sufficient to require reversal of the District Court's decision.

IV.

Under Idaho law, FATCO cannot assert BOPs full credit bid as a

defense to liability and the District Court erred in relving on the full credit bid to defeat

In conjunction with its discussion of Sections 7 and 9 of the Policy Conditions
and Stipulations, the District Court noted that "[t]here can be no question that regardless of
motive or fair market value, the full credit bid extinguished the debt and mortgage," quoting a
passage from this Court's decision in Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42,
44. 137 P.3d 429, 431 (2006) (credit bid extinguishes the debtor's debt to the extent of the bid).
The District Court's statement essentially articulates the so-called "full credit bid
rule, which arises from anti-deficiency statutes and was apparently first stated by the California
Supreme Court in Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981 (1975). In Cornelison, the court
interpreted California's anti-deficiency statute and held that an action for waste by a deed of trust
beneficiary against the borrowers/grantors and their successors in interest was precluded because
the beneficiary had purchased the property at a foreclosure sale with a full credit bid, which
satisfied the debt and established there was no impairment of the security for the debt.

Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 991-2.
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However, FATCO is not entitled to benefit from the full credit bid rule under
Idaho law, and BOI respectfully submits it was error for the District Court to entirely rely on it in
granting summary judgment. The Court of Appeal's decision in Willis v. Realty Country,

Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 316-7, 824 P.2d 887,891-2 (App. 1991) (pet. rev. denied, February 28,
1992), and this Court's decision in First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172,
174.

P.2d 683, 685 (1988), hold that the protections afforded by Idaho's anti-deficiency

statute, and the full credit bid rule embodied therein, do not extend to anyone except the
borrower/grantor on a secured obligation.
In Gaige, First Security Bank extended various loans secured by a deed oftrust on
a building and other collateral to a company. Gaige, 115 Idaho at 173, 765 P.2d at 684. The
president of the company, Gaige, also executed personal guarantees of the company's debt. Id.
After the company defaulted, the Bank foreclosed on the deed of trust on the building, and was
high bidder at the sale. Jd. Rather than foreclosing on the company's remaining collateral, the
Bank sued Gaige personally as guarantor of the company's debt to recover the remaining balance
due on the notes. Id. No deficiency judgment was sought against the company itself. Id.
In defense of the action on the guarantees, Gaige asserted that the deed of trust
anti -deficiency statute, Idaho Code § 45-1512, precluded the Bank from bringing the action on
the guarantees. ld. The Statute provides:
45-1512. Money judgment -- Action seeking balance due on obligation. At any time
within 3 months after any sale under a deed of trust, as hereinbefore provided, a money
judgment may be sought for the balance due upon the obligation for which such deed of
trust was given as security, and in such action the plaintiff shall set forth in his complaint
the entire amount of indebtedness which was secured by such deed of trust and the
amount for which the same was sold and the fair market value at the date of sale, together
with interest from such date of sale, costs of sale and attorney's fees. Before rendering
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judgment the court shall find the fair market value of the real property sold at the time of
sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the entire
amount of indebtedness due at the time of sale exceeds the fair market value at that time,
with interest from date of sale, but in no event may the judgment exceed the difference
between the amount for which such property was sold and the entire amount of the
indebtedness secured by the deed of trust. (Emphasis added.)
This Court rejected Gaige's assertion and held that the protections afforded by the
Statute do not extend to guarantors but instead protect only borrowers/grantors on the secured
obligation:

The first issue we address is whether our anti-deficiency statute, I.e. §
512, [fn
omitted] applies to Gaige as a guarantor. Resolution of this issue had been reserved
previously in Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 663 P.2d 653 (1983). We decide it
today, and 'we hold that it does not.

1. C. § 45-1512 applies to claims by a creditor secured by a deed of trust for the balance
due atl:er a deed of trust sale. The protection in I.e. § 45-1512 is given to the
borrower-grantor who gives the security interest described in the deed of trust.
However, Gaige was not the borrower-grantor who gave the security interest
covered by the deed of trust. The corporation, A.J. Gaige & Associates, Inc., was the
borrower and grantor of the security. John Gaige merely guaranteed that debt.
Gaige argues that I.C. § 45-1512 protection should extend by implication to guarantors on
public policy grounds because guarantors and deed of trust debtors alike share a need for
protection from creditors who desire to recover their indebtedness secured by the deed of
trust. While there may be arguments for extending anti-deficiency protection to
guarantors, that action is for the legislature to do, not the court. In some states, such
as Alaska, the legislature saw fit to extend protection to guarantors, [citation omitted]; at
present ours has not. Although the Nevada court is apparently "convinced that it is
unsound to deny guarantors the benefits of[ anti-deficiency] legislation," [citation
omitted], a majority of state courts considering the issue have declined to expand the
coverage of the statute to those not covered by the statute. [citations omitted] We deem it
better policy to follow the wording of the statute and leave any expansion of
coverage to the legislature. (Emphasis added.)
Gaige, 115 Idaho at 174-5, 765 P.2d at 685-6.
Three years later in Willis, the Court of Appeals expressly rejected an attempt by
one who also was not a borrower/grantor to avoid liability for property damages by asserting
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California's full credit bid rule, relying on this Court's decision in Gaige. Willis, 121 Idaho at
316-7,824 P.2d at 891-2.
The facts in Willis are more convoluted than those in Gaige. Elnora Wise sold her
motel to the Pickens who executed a promissory note and deed of trust in favor of Wise as part of
the sale. Willis, 121 Idaho at 313-5, 824 P.2d at 888-90. The Pickens subsequently defaulted on
the note and Mrs. Wise instituted foreclosure proceedings, which were automatically stayed for a
considerable period by the Pickens' bankruptcy. Jd. After the stay was lifted, Mrs. Wise
assigned her deed of trust rights to Realty Country, who proceeded with the foreclosure and
purchased the property pursuant to a full credit bid at the sale. Jd. While the foreclosure was
pending, Mrs. Wise permitted others to remove most of the fixtures from the property. Jd.
Realty Country advised Mrs. Wise it would offset the resulting damage to the property against
the payments it owed her pursuant to the assignment agreement. Jd. Mrs. Wise subsequently
died and the personal representative of Mrs. Wise's estate filed for a declaratory judgment that
Realty Country was not entitled to the offset, arguing in part that Realty Country's full credit bid
at the foreclosure sale precluded it from claiming the offset. Id.
On appeal, the Court expressly held that the Estate could not avoid liability for the
offset by asserting the full credit bid rule formulated by the California Supreme Court in
Cornelison, because the Estate was not the borrower/grantor on the deed of trust and therefore
was not entitled to such protection under Idaho law:
III. FULL CREDIT BID

We turn first to the issue whether Realty Country's full credit bid at the foreclosure
sale precludes it from recovering the costs of repairing the damage to the property.
As authority for this proposition, the Estate cites Cornelison. In Cornelison, the court,
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interpreting the California anti-deficiency statute, held that a beneficiary under a deed of
trust who purchased property at a private foreclosure sale by bidding the outstanding
balance was not entitled to recover damages in an action for waste against the successorin-interest of the original grantor of the deed of trust
To determine this issue, we look to our own anti-deficiency statute, I.e. § 45-1512. [fn
omitted] Our Supreme Court has determined that the protection in I.e. § 45-1512
extends only to the borrower-grantor who gives the security interest in the deed of
trust. [citation omitted] The Court stated that the protection in I.e. § 45-1512 did not
extend to the guarantor and declined to extend the coverage of the anti-deficiency statute
to those not specifically covered by the statute [.]

Applying Gaige to the present case, the Pickens were the borrower-grantors entitled to
protection under the Idaho anti-deficiency statute; in the event that Realty Country had
sued the Pickens for the cost of repairing the property, the full credit bid would
precluded the action. However, Mrs. Wise is the assignor of beneficial rights
under the deed of trust. Relying on our Supreme Court's interpretation of I.C. § 45-1512,
we conclude that Mrs. Wise is not entitled to protection under the anti-deficiency statute.
Thus, Cornelison is not applicable to the facts of this casco Consequently, Realty
Country's full credit bid at the foreclosure sale does not preclude it from recovering
the Estate the costs of repairing the property. (Emphasis added.)
Willis, 121 Idaho at 316-7,824 P.2d at 891-2.

Thus it is clear that no one other than the borrower/grantor on a secured obligation
can rely on the full credit bid rule that is embodied in Idaho's anti-deficiency statute to avoid
liability.
Moreover, this Court's statement regarding credit bids in Appel, relied on by the
District Court in its decision here, does not hold to the contrary. Appel was an action to eject the
borrowers/grantors on a deed of trust from the secured property after the trustee's sale, and the
discussion regarding credit bids arose in the context of deciding whether or not a credit bid, as
opposed to a cash bid, was permissible pursuant to Idaho's deed of trust foreclosure statutes.
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Appel, 143 Idaho at 43-4,137 P.3d 431-2. Accordingly, Appel does nothing to disturb the

decisions in Gaige and Willis.
Therefore, since FA TeO is clearly not the borrower/debtor on the deed of trust at
issue here, it is not entitled to the benefit of the full credit bid rule, and the District Court erred in
relying on the full credit bid to dismiss BOrs claim.
V.

The District Court misconstrued the meaning and effect of Section

7(a)(ii) of the Policy, and incorrectly concluded that the earliest point that damages occur is
the time of the foreclosure sale. There is instead abundant evidence in the record that
clearly demonstrates SOl sustained "loss or damage" before the trustee's sale took place.
The District Court concluded that "[t]he foreclosure sale is the earliest point at
which time damages occur," and held that due to the full credit bid, "there was no unpaid
principal indebtedness after the foreclosure sale" under Section 7(a)(ii). (R. Vol. 2, p. 460.)
In doing so, the Court simply rejected as "immaterial" the abundant evidence in
the record that clearly demonstrates Bor sustained "loss or damage" long before the foreclosure
sale. Accordingly, Bor respectfully submits that both conclusions are incorrect, for the reasons
discussed in turn below.
The Court's very brief discussion of damages demonstrates that it failed to
recognize the crucial distinction between the time when "loss or damage" begins to "occur," and
the time when the amount of damage can actually be "determined:"
[T]here could be no determination of damages "insured against" until the foreclosure
sale i.e., if the amount recovered through sale or bid and transfer of title was less than the
amount of the debt, the difference would be the damages recoverable by way of a
deficiency judgment and/or claim against the Policy. The foreclosure sale is the earliest
point at which time damages occur. It is axiomatic that creditors frequently are made
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whole by reason of a credit bid at a foreclosure sale. As such, until the foreclosure sale
takes place, damages are inchoate and speculative. (Emphasis added.)
(R. Vol. 2. p. 460.)

However, Section 7(a)(ii) does not say that the amount of the secured
indebtedness should be "determined" after a foreclosure sale. Instead it plainly states that the
relevant point in time to calculate the amount of the debt is the time when "loss or damage"
insured against by the Policy "occurs." (R. Vol. 2. p. 453.) There is a clear distinction between
the two. For example, there is no doubt that an injured car wreck victim's loss or damage
"occurs" at the time of the collision. But it is equally clear that it may take years of medical
treatment before his or her damages can finally be "determined.

In similar fashion in this case,

the time when Bors "loss or damage" could have been ultimately "determined" may well have
been after the sale. In fact the "determination" ofBOrs ultimate "loss or damage" may not have
been possible until after it attempted to mitigate its loss by finally selling the property to a third
party in November of2010. However, that does not mean that BOl's "loss or damage" did not
"occur" long before the trustee's sale was held.
The District Court's statements that "[i]t is axiomatic that creditors frequently are
made whole by reason of a credit bid at a foreclosure sale," and therefore, "until the foreclosure
sale takes place, damages are inchoate and speculative" further illustrates the point that the Court
was incorrectly focused on when damages could be "determined" rather than when they "occur."
Moreover, the first statement is basically a comment on potential mitigation from
which the second does not logically flow. Although BOI concedes it will eventually have to
prove its damages with reasonable certainty, the mere fact that contract damages are perhaps not

20

capable of exact proof does not preclude their availability as a matter of la\v. See, Hummer v,
Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P,2d 981, 987 (1996),
Finally, the District Court's statement that "if the amount recovered through sale
or bid and transfer of title was less than the amount of the debt, the difference would be the
damages recoverable by way of a deficiency judgment and/or claim against the Policy" suggests
that the Court concluded that the only kind of "loss or damage"

Bor is entitled to recover is that

which a lender can recover against a debtor in an action for a deficiency judgment.
While that was certainly one of FA TCO' s consistent themes below, nothing in the
Policy supports it. Section 7(a) certainly does not. It provides:
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall not exceed the least of:
(i) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable, the amount of
insurance as defined in Section 2( c) of these Conditions and Stipulations:
(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage as
limited or provided under Section 8 of these Conditions and Stipulations or as reduced
under Section 9 of these Conditions and Stipulations, at the time the loss or damage
insured against by this policy occurs, together with interest thereon; or
(iii) the difference between the value of the insured estate or interest as insured and the
value of the insured estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance insured
against by this policy,
, .. (Emphasis added.)

CR. Vol. 2, p, 455.)
The language highlighted above demonstrates that in general, Section 7(a)
functions as nothing more than a maximum "policy limit" on FA TCO's liability, the dollar
amount of which may fluctuate over the lifetime of the Policy, depending on various
circumstances and events, Thus at any given point, the maximum dollar amount may be the
amount stated in Schedule A, (in this case $227,041,30); or it may be the amount defined by the
parameters of Section 2(c) when applicable; or it may be the total amount of the debt, principal
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and interest combined, at the time loss or damage insured against occurs, minus any limitations
or reductions imposed by Sections 8 or 9 respectively; or it may be the amount represented by the
ditTerence in value between the estate or interest as insured and as subject to the specific peril
insured against: whichever happens to be less at the relevant point in time.
In fact, the terms "loss or damage" are undefined anywhere in the Policy itself
Accordingly, such common, non-technical words are given their ordinary meaning as applied by
laymen in daily usage. See, e.g. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co.

(~r Idaho,

147 Idaho 67, 71,205

P.3d 1203, 1207 (2009).
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "loss" as "an undesirable outcome of a risk; the
disappearance or diminution of value, usu. in an unexpected or relatively unpredictable way.
Black's Law Dictionary 963 (8th ed. 2004). Alerriam-Webster Online Dictionary in tum defines

"loss" as a "failure to keep or to continue to have something, the experience of having something
taken from you or destroyed.

Black's defines the noun "damage" as "Loss or injury to person or

property." Black's at 416. Merriam- Webster Online in tum defines "damage" as "loss or harm
resulting from injury to person, property, or reputation." None of the definitions even suggest
that "loss or damage" must be actionable, much less capable of "determination" with
mathematical precision. Given that the terms are employed conjunctively in the Policy, anyone
of these definitions is sufficient to establish that BOI suffered "loss or damage" which "occurred"
long before the foreclosure sale.
The record here certainly demonstrates that BOI suffered significant "loss or
damage" as defined above prior to the sale. The failure to locate one of the four-plexes on Lot 1
substantially decreased Lot] 's value, thereby impairing BOl's collateral.
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CR. Vol.

1, p. 70, ~ 10.)

The competing appraisals of the parties suggest a difference in value for Lot 1 as high as
$257,000.00. (R. Vol. 2, p. 329,

4-5; Vol. 2, pp. 234, 339.)

The failure to locate one of the four-plexes on Lot 1 also eliminated BOl's ability
to replace the construction loans with the term loans that would have constituted the Petersons'
long term financing, which BOI could then sell individually into the secondary mortgage market,
in accordance with Bors original plan and routine practice.

CR. Vol.

1, p. 70,

~

9-10; Vol. 2, pp.

331-3,,13, 17.) In addition, the two Lots could no longer be sold separately because both fourplexes "vere built on Lot 2 and neither had street frontage. (Id.)
The secondary market for loans on 1-4 family units is entirely different than multifamily units in excess of four units. (R. Vol. 2, p. 332,

15.) BOl made inquiries and could not

locate a lender that would accept the single eight-unit property. (R. Vol. 2, p. 332,

r l3.)

As a

result, BOI was left without a secondary market for its debt instruments because the property was
characterized "as built" as an eight-plex, tightly squeezed onto an undersized lot. (R. Vol. 2, p.
332-3, ~ 13, 18.) Thereafter, from the time the Petersons defaulted on the construction loans
through the foreclosure and sale process to the date BOI was eventually able to resell both lots as
a single unit, it incurred additional out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of at least $37,816.05.
(R. Vol. 2, p. 329,

~

9.)

In short, rather than being free and clear of the project in March, 2009, after
replacing the construction loans with term loans and selling them individually into the secondary
market as planned, BOl was instead forced to deal with the Peterson's default, foreclose on its
impaired collateral and incur tens of thousands of dollars of out-of-pocket expenses, all because
the four-plex was not built on Lot 1, and all before the foreclosure sale ever took place. It seems
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difficult to imagine a more clear cut case of "loss or damage" which this Policy expressly insured
against.
Given this state of the record, the first "loss or damage" as commonly defined
"occurred," when the four-plex was not in fact built on Lot L as "insured against" by
Endorsement 116 to the Policy. At the very latest, BOI sustained "loss or damage" when the
Petersons defaulted on their loan, and Bor was forced to institute foreclosure proceedings to take
title to Lot 1 without the contemplated four-plex. Indeed, some courts have suggested the proper
time to measure a lender's loss is the point at which the lender makes the loan in reliance on the
title policy issued by the insurer in the first place. See, e.g., Equity income Partners LP v.
Chicago Tille ins, Co" 2012 WL 3871505, (unpublished opinion) (D. Az. 2012) slip op. *3-4

(nothing to suggest loss suffered should only be measured at the time of ultimate foreclosure,
loss was suffered at the time lender issued the loan in reliance on title policy); see, also, Citicorp
Sav, oflllinois v, SteH'art Title Guar. Co" 840 F.2d 526 (7th Cir.1988).

But regardless of which point in time one chooses, a significant portion of the
"loss or damage insured against" which BOI "sustained" as a result of the failure to build the
four-plex on Lot 1 "occurred" well before the eventual foreclosure sale was completed and at a
time when the "unpaid principal on the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage ... ,
together with interest thereon" was in excess of $200,000.00.
At a minimum, material issues of fact make summary judgment inappropriate on
this record, and accordingly, the District Court's decision should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, BOr respectfully asks this Court to reverse the
District Court's decision, and remand this action to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's opinion.
DATED

of September, 2013.
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT
HANSEN & HOOPES,

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing document
were on this date served upon the person named below, at the address set out below his name,
either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to him true and correct copies of said
document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand
delivery to him; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this

of September, 2013.

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, PLLC
] 000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P,O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83205

o
o
o

26

U.S. Mail
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

